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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea (Sery1) to Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
§41-6A-502, Unlawful Possession of Alcohol by a Minor, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code § 32A-12-209, and Immediate Notice of Accident Required, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code §12-16-010(a). The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2009), wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in appeals from a court of record in 
criminal cases. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Issues for Review 
Whether this court should review the lower court's denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on lack of reasonable articulable 
suspicion when (i) the officer testified to observing the defendant jaywalking, and 
(ii) there is no evidence to contradict the officer's testimony? 
1
 State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. of App. 1988) This case allows a defendant to 
plead guilty or no contest to alleged charges while preserving the right to appeal an 
adverse pretrial ruling. The defense did not cite this preservation in this record other than 
citing to the motion hearing but the City acknowledges that there was an agreement that 
the plea was conditional. 
l 
B. Standard of Review 
In Salt Lake City v. Bench, this court determined that "we review the trial 
court's factual findings for clear error [,] and we review its conclusions of law for 
correctness." 177 P.3d 655, at 658, (Utah Ct. of App. 2008). "In search and seizure 
cases, no deference is granted to . . . the [trial] court regarding the application of law 
to underlying factual findings." Bench, quoting State v. Alverez, 147 P.3d 425 ( Utah 
2006) (See State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004) review."). 177 P.3d 655, at 658. 
III. RELEVANT ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following ordinances, statutes, and rules relevant to the determination of this 
matter are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah Code § 4 l-6a-1003. 
Utah Code §77-7-15. 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2009). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 6, 2009, defendant/appellant Austin Hughes was charged by 
information with: (1) Driving under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor 
under Utah Code §41-6a-502; (2) Unlawful Possession of Another's Identification 
Documents, a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code § 76-6-1105(2)(a); Unlawful 
Possession of Alcohol by a Minor, a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code § 32a-12-
209; (3) Failure to Provide Immediate Notice of Accident, a class B misdemeanor under 
Salt Lake City Code §12.16.010(a): (4) Driving on Alcohol Restrictions, a class B 
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misdemeanor under Utah Code §41-6a-530; (5) Providing False Information to a Law 
Enforcement Officer, a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code §76-8-506; and (6) 
Negligent Collision, a class C misdemeanor under Salt Lake City Code §12.52.340. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that Officer Ruff lacked 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant. A motion hearing was held on 
November 11, 2009, wherein Officer Ruff testified to observing the defendant violate a 
traffic law and having reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in 
more serious criminal activity. The defendant's motion was heard on January 4, 2010. 
The court reviewed memoranda and arguments of counsel, and denied defendant's 
motion. 
Following the court's denial, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to Driving 
under the Influence, Unlawful Possession of Alcohol by a Minor, and Failure to Provide 
Immediate Notice of Accident. The remaining charges were dismissed without prejudice. 
Defendant now appeals. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Michael Ruff (hereinafter referred to as Ruff) was just finishing another 
call in the area of 121 East and 700 South, Salt Lake City (R 75:4). According to Ruff 
this took place at about 2:30 a.m. February 15, 2009. (R 75:6) Ruff noticed defendant 
wearing only a t-shirt and jeans. (R 75:6) Ruff noticed that defendant was not wearing 
work-out clothes. (R 75:6) Ruff noted that defendant was not wearing a coat. (R 75:6) 
Ruff noted that the weather that evening was in the low 20's. (R 75:6) (R 75:15) 
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Ruff testified that defendant was running (at a full sprint) down the middle of the 
South side of the street. (R 75:6) Ruff then testified that defendant ran across State 
Street (not in a crosswalk). (R 75:5) 
Ruff noted that defendant ran behind a bank, (R 75:5) that was closed, (R 75:7) 
and fenced in. (R 75:6) Ruff testified that there were no cars in the bank parking lot. (R 
75:7) 
Ruff testified that he did none of the following when stopping defendant: 
a. Shout at him; (R 75:9) 
b. Place him in handcuffs; (R 75:9) 
c. Point his weapon at him; (R 75:9) 
d. Rush him; (R 75:10) 
e. Shine his flashlight at him; or; (R 75:10) 
f. Place him in his car. (R 75:9) 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The stop in this case was justified in its inception because the officer observed the 
defendant jaywalk. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AS THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED 
TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that a reviewing court had "no obligation to reach 
the merits of the [defendant's] argument if the defendant was required to, but failed to 
marshall the evidence. Ostermiller v.Ostermiller. 233 P.3d 489 (Utah 2010). 
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"If the application of the standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing 
court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining whether 
the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of law". n5 . Chen v. 
Stewart, 100P.3d 1177, 1184-1185. (Utah 2004) 
"Even where the defendants] purport to challenge only the legal ruling,... if a 
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely 
fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence." Id. (quoting In 
Re Estate of Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343 at 1347-1349 (Utah 1994)) (explaining that failure 
of the appellant to marshal the evidence meant findings were presumed valid, proving 
fatal to her legal argument). "This duty requires an appellant to marshal all the evidence 
in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, at 1195. (quoting 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)). "The challenging party must 
temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; he or 
she must play the "devil's advocate." Chen v. Stewart, at 1195. (quoting Harding v. Bell, 
57 P.3d 1093 (Utah 2002)). "Appellants must provide a precisely focused summary of all 
the evidence supporting the findings they challenge." Id "This summary must correlate 
all particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and then convince us that the 
n5 "This is not to say that all fact-sensitive matters require broad grants of discretion. 
See, e.g., State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003) ("When a case involves the 
reasonableness of a search and seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court . . . 
.") (internal quotations omitted). 
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trial court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its findings." Chen v. Stewart, at 
1195. "What appellants cannot do is merely re-argue the factual case they presented in 
the trial court." Id. "In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must 
demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those 
findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. 
Here the defendant has not marshaled the evidence. Defendant infers a legal 
argument but then Defendant's brief provides no explanation of why he believes the trial 
court could not find reasonable articulable suspicion. Defendant appears 1o argue that this 
case is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. 
However, defendant's brief is replete with instances where he is arguing facts, 
most of them not in evidence. Defendant asks this court to consider what is not in the 
police officer's report. Defendant also asks this court to consider his suggestion as to 
why a person could be on bank property after bank hours. Defendant appears to argue 
that the trial court could not have reached the decision it did. 
B. THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED TWO CRIMINAL OFFENSES IN 
THE OFFICER'S PRESENCE THUS REASONABLE SUSPICION 
EXISTED FOR THE INITIAL STOP. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that there are "three [different] levels of 
police encounters with the public." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
3
 Defendant also argues that the (Appellant's brief page 10) that the officer's credibility is 
somehow at issue because he left the courtroom without permission. The City's position 
is that defendant is reading far too much into the trial court's comment of "I guess I could 
excuse the officer, but he's excused himself walked right out of the courtroom." (R75:21) 
This appears to be more of just a passing comment by the judge and less a commentary 
on the officer's character. 
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1987)(citing United States v. Merritt 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also, 
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that there are 
"three categories of citizen encounters with law enforcement officials"). "Each level has 
different legal rules that apply." State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 660 (Utah 2002). 
The three levels are as follows: "(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed." Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
The evidence in this case showed that Officer Ruff saw defendant jaywalk. (R75:5) 
Specifically, defendant crossed the street without being in a crosswalk in violation of 
Utah Code § 41-6a-1003. Under Utah law, pedestrians have duties. One of those duties is 
that "a pedestrian may not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk." See Utah 
Code § 41-6a-1003(3). There is no time limit in this statute, i.e. it applies at every hour 
of the day. "The right-of-way is not absolute for either pedestrian or motorist, but both 
have a continuing duty at all times to use reasonable care for the safety of others." 
Langlois v. Rees, 351 P.2d 638 (Utah 1960).emphasis added. 
Once Defendant committed this violation, Officer Ruff had reasonable articulable 
suspicion to initiate a stop. Defendant was not in a crosswalk area, and he was not 
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wearing running or workout clothes. (R75:6) This is a hazard especially at 2:30 a.m. 
when it is dark and pedestrians are to spot in such circumstances. 
With regard to the trespass the District Court made no finding on this issue. What 
the District Court did find was that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop 
defendant based on his jaywalking infraction. (R 76:9) 
C A LEVEL TWO ENCOUNTER WAS JUSTIFIED IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE THE OFFICER WITNESSED A CRIME. 
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually 
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 
(10th Cir. 1991); see also, Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an 
investigative detention or "Terry stop"4). Although a level two encounter constitutes a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 
1537. Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime," an officer may initiate an 
investigative detention without consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407. 
After commencing an investigative detention, officers must "diligently [pursue] a 
means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1132 (Utah 1994). Finally, in determining the reasonableness of an officer's stop, there 
is no bright-line test. State v. Baird, 763 P.2 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). When an 
4
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; 88 S. Ct. 1868; 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; (1968) 
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officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that he or she has observed a public offense, 
the officer may stop that person to conduct further investigation. See generally, Utah 
Code §77-7-15 (1980) (entitled: "Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect"). 
Reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. 
Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when courts 
are determining "reasonable-suspicion ...they must look at the "totality of the 
circumstances" of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a "particularized and 
objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. See, United States v. Cortez, (449 U.S. 
411, 417; 66 L. Ed. 2d 621; 101 S. Ct. 690 (1981)). at 417-418. 'This process allows 
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude 
an untrained person." Id. at 418. See also (Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699; 
134 L. Ed. 2d 911; 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996)) (reviewing court must give "due weight" to 
factual inferences drawn by resident judges and local law enforcement officers). 
"Although an officer's reliance on a mere "'hunch'" is insufficient to justify a stop, (Terry, 
supra, at 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868), the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance 
of the evidence standard, (Sokolow, supra, at 7, 109 S.Ct 1581)." United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266; at 274; 122 S. Ct. 744; 151 L. Ed. 2d 740; (2002) 
Although a traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
a reasonable traffic stop is constitutional. In determining whether a traffic stop is 
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reasonable, the Utah Supreme Court has held that courts must answer two questions: "(1) 
Was the police officer's action justified at its inception?" and "(2) Was the resulting 
detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference 
in the first place?" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. The Lopez Court stated that a "valid 
investigatory stop may include 'a request for identification and inquiry concerning the 
suspicious conduct of the person detained." Id. at 1133. Lopez, quoting Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (1981). 
A stop of a vehicle (in this case a person) is justified if the officer witnesses a 
traffic violation. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also State 
v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "An observed traffic violation gives the officer "at the least, 
probable cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic offense." State v. Smith, 781 
P.2d 879, 882 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 
498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "when an officer observes a traffic offense -
however minor -- he has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle"); emphasis 
added. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983). "An observed violation, however, 
is not required." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. "In the words of the United States 
Supreme Court, as long as an officer suspects that the "driver is violating any one of the 
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle." Lopez, quoting, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661; 59 L. Ed 2d. 
660; 99 S.Ct. 1391(1979). 
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Officer Ruff witnessed the defendant cross the street while not in a crosswalk. 
Officer Ruffs testimony (quoted supra) supports the district court's finding of reasonable 
articulate suspicion for jaywalking. 
Officer Ruff testified that he did not put the defendant in handcuffs; did not place 
defendant into his patrol car; did not point his weapon at him, did not rush him, was not 
shouting at him, did not shine his flashlight in his face; and that he used his regular voice 
when asking the defendant questions. (R 75:9) The evidence showed that Ruff was 
simply trying to stop someone for jaywalking. In answer to the Lopez query, the stop was 
justified in its inception because the defendant was jaywalking in the officer's presence. 
D. AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS USED TO DETERMINE THE 
REASONABLENESS OF THE STOP. 
In Lopez, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the objection standard of judging the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 873 P.2d 1127 at 
1133. "The constitutionality of a traffic stop turns on whether a "reasonable . . . officer, in 
view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped the 
vehicle." State v. Lopez, quoting State v Lopez, 831 p.2d 1040 at 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) "In other words, the Fourth Amendment simply does not require an officer's state 
of mind to perfectly correspond to his or her legally justified actions." State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, quoting United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990). 
Although not completely questioned on this subject by the defense, defense 
counsel seems to aver that Ruff had an ulterior motive for stopping defendant. There are 
no facts in evidence to support the defendant's position that the officer had any such 
11 
motive. Ruff testified that he did not articulate in his report that defendant was 
jaywalking. (R75:14) Even though Ruff did not write the violations in his report it does 
not negate their happening. 
E. THE CITY HAS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING WHICH 
CHARGES TO FILE. 
Defendant argues that a part of this Court's analysis should include the fact that he 
was not charged with Failure to Use a Crosswalk, or Trespassing. However, the 
Prosecution has the discretion to "determine whether or not to prosecute, what charge 
should be made, and whether or not to dismiss . . . or accept a plea to a lesser offense." 
State v. Loveless, 194 P.3d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) quoting State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 
404 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor does have the 
discretion to decide what charges to file, including the right to charge in the alternative, 
see State v. Montova, 910 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and to determine "in what 
manner to prosecute [a] case," Bell 785 P.2d at 402. In the instant case the City chose to 
file the more egregious charges. Defendant has no basis to argue that because the City 
chose not to file the traffic infractions that somehow (1) these infractions did not occur 
(2) that reasonable articulable suspicion did not exist, (3) and/or that this lack of charging 
negates the offenses. 
F. THE ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THIS COURT IS THE 
OFFICER'S TESTIMONY. 
A defendant can choose to offer testimony in a motion to suppress hearing without 
waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination ... "because such testimony 
12 
is not admissible at trial.'5 State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). "The United States 
Supreme Court has held that 'testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to 
suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial.' United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83, 88, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). 'Without this rule, a defendant 
would have to surrender his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in 
order to assert a valid Fourth Amendment claim. Id'" Hansen, at 663, (F4)5 
In defendant's brief he suggests that there are many reasons why a person could 
possibly be on bank property after hours. (Appellant's brief page 8). But the City 
contends that these statements are merely conjecture on the part of defense counsel and 
do not constitute evidence on which a court can base a decision. 
In addition, the trial court made its ruling on reasonable articulable suspicion 
solely on the jaywalking infraction. Defendant provides no argument that the officer 
could not or did not see defendant jaywalk. Therefore this Court has no evidence that the 
jaywalking infraction happened in any manner contrary to the officer's testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
5
 Defendant chose not to testify in the present case; here the only evidence before the 
court was the officer's testimony. The City is not suggesting that defendant must testify it 
is only pointing out that the only evidence before the court is the officer's sworn 
testimony. 
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Dated this day of August 30, 2010. 
Dawn W. Emery Q 
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor 
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APPENDIX 
ADDENDUM A 
Statutes and Ordinances 
UTAH CODES 4 l-6a-1003 
Pedestrians yielding right-of-way — Limits on pedestrians 
(1) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk 
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles on the roadway. 
(2) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where there is a pedestrian tunnel or 
overhead pedestrian crossing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway. 
(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation, a 
pedestrian may not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. 
(4) (a) A pedestrian may not cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless authorized by 
a traffic-control device. 
(b) If a pedestrian is authorized to cross diagonally under Subsection (4)(a), the 
pedestrian shall cross only as directed by the appropriate traffic-control device. 
UTAH CODE §77-7-15 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — Grounds 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
UTAH CODE 78A-4-103. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
